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The United States has led the effort to promote peaceful use of nuclear power 
amongst states actively utilizing it as well as those looking to deploy the technology in 
the near future.  With the attraction being demonstrated by various countries towards 
nuclear power comes the concern that a nation may have military aspirations for the use 
of nuclear energy.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established 
nuclear safeguard protocols and procedures to mitigate nuclear proliferation.  The work 
herein proposed a strategy to further enhance existing safeguard protocols by considering 
safeguard in nuclear fuel design.  The strategy involved the use of radionuclides to profile 
nuclear fuels. Six radionuclides were selected as identifier materials.  The decay and 
transmutation of these radionuclides were analyzed in reactor operation environment.  
MCNPX was used to simulate a reactor core.  The perturbation in reactivity of the core 
due to the loading of the radionuclides was insignificant.  The maximum positive and 
negative reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256 
and at day 2000 with -0.00441 ± 0.00249, respectively.  The mass of the radionuclides 
were practically unaffected by transmutation in the core; the change in radionuclide 
inventory was dominated by natural decay.  The maximum material lost due to 
transmutation was 1.17% in Eu154.  Extraneous signals from fission products identical to 
the radionuclide compromised the identifier signals.  Eu154 saw a maximum intensity 
change at EOC and 30 days post-irradiation of 1260% and 4545%, respectively. Cs137 
saw a minimum change of 12% and 89%, respectively.  Mitigation of the extraneous 
signals is cardinal to the success of the proposed strategy.  The predictability of natural 





I would like to acknowledge my advisor, Dr. Ayodeji B. Alajo, for all his help in 
this research project.  When I had questions or had trouble understanding something, he 
was very patient and took the time to answer my questions.  I was at a disadvantage when 
I first arrived on this campus due to my non-nuclear background, but Dr. Alajo 
encouraged me to work harder to catch up with the rest of my peers.  I truly appreciate all 
of his help and time. 
 I would also like to acknowledge Zackary Stone for letting me run MCNPX on 
his personal computer.  Without his help, my code would still be running.  He was a big 
help for me finishing on time.  I also would like to thank Manish Sharma, Lucas Tucker 










LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS…………………………………………………...….….…vii 




1.1.1 Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguard…………………………1 
1.1.2 Special Nuclear Materials Handling in Light Water  
Reactor (LWR) Systems…………………………………………..3 
1.1.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Systems…………………...….4 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH………………………………4 
2. DETERMINATION OF TAGGING RADIONUCLIDES……………………….7 
2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA……………………………………………..………7 
2.2 SELECTED TAGGING MATERIAL………………………………………..8 
2.3 LIMITATIONS OF SELECTED MATERIAL……………………………....8 
3. EFFECTIVENESS METRICS OF TAGGING MATERIAL…………………...12 
3.1 SIGNAL INTERFERENCE…………………………………………………12 
3.2 SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE IDENTIFIER TO 
      TRANSMUTATION…………………………………………………….…..14 
 3.2.1 Uncertainty Associated with Nuclear Cross Section Data………...15 





3.3 IMPACT OF TAGGING MATERIAL ON REACTOR 
      OPERATION…………………………………………………………….…..18 
4. ASSESSMENT OF PWR WITH TAGGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES………….…20 
4.1 THE PWR MODEL…………………………………………………….……20 
 4.1.1 PWR Core Details………………………………………………….20 
 4.1.2 Tagging Material Placement……………………………………….23 
4.2 REACTOR OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS – CHANGE IN keff……..23 
4.3 TRANSMUTATION EFFECTS…………………………………….………25 
4.4 EFFECT OF FISSION PRODUCTS ON IDENTIFIER SIGNAL 














LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure               Page 
3.1 Spent fuel signal interfering with identifier signal……………………………..……13 
3.2 Comparative cross sections of each radionuclide from the identifier from various 
      nuclear data libraries from Janis-3.4…………………………………………...…….16 
3.3 A comparison of the neutron flux in the fuel assembly, plenum, at the unshielded      
      tagging material and shielded tagging material………………………………….…..18 
3.4 Flux spectrum at the identifier location overlaid with the ENDF/B-VII.0  
      cross section of each radionuclide in the identifier…………………………………..19 
4.1 x-y cross-sectional view of the core model in MCNPX Visual Editor  
      Plotter Version X_24E........................................................................................….....22 
4.2 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor  
      Plotter Version X_24E……………………………………………………………….22 
4.3 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor  
      Plotter Version X_24E………………………………………………………….……23 
4.4 x-z cross-sectional view of the identifier in a fuel pin…………………………….....24 
4.5 Criticality of the core with and without the tagging material over time and  
      change in reactivity due to the tagging material………………………….…….……25 
4.6 Percentage of tagging material lost over time due to transmutation…………………28 
4.7 Gamma spectrum of the tagging material at the beginning of cycle, end of cycle,  










LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
2.1 List of potential radionuclides for the unique identifier……………………………...9 
2.2 Checklist of the radionuclides that met each criterion…………………………….…10 
4.1 Core design specifications………………………………………………….………..21 





Nuclear energy technology is becoming very attractive to many countries around 
the world.  The promise of energy security and reduced reliance on fossil fuel is a major 
driver for the renewed interest in nuclear energy.  The attraction to this technology is a 
positive development with regards to the expansion of the industry.  However, it also 
creates concerns of abuse from countries with clandestine intentions.   
There has been consideration that countries with genuine interest in pursuing 
nuclear technology for peaceful application be supported by countries with the technical 
know-how.  Under this proposal, countries seeking nuclear energy (receiving state) will 
be supplied with nuclear reactors appropriate for the desired purpose [1][2]. The 
technology supplier would be responsible for the installation, maintenance and retrieval 
of the nuclear components at the end of life.  In the case of a power reactor, retrieval of 
spent fuel may not be immediate.  The spent fuel will require some cooling time.  During 
the cooling period, it is important to safeguard the spent fuel inventory.  This is 
particularly true in a situation where the fuel is entrusted to the receiving state during the 
cooling period.  Such trust implicitly assumes that the receiving state will keep watch 
over the inventory, and that it will not attempt a diversion of the spent fuel for nuclear 
proliferation and arms development purposes.   
1.1.1 Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguard.  At the end of World War II, 
the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s superpowers.  




the birth of the Nuclear Arms Race.  During this time, each nation was stockpiling 
nuclear weapons and producing nuclear warheads with the capability to totally annihilate 
the other; which led to a situation termed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) because an 
attack on the enemy would ensure a counterattack [3].  This stalemate helped keep each 
side from attacking the other.  The rest of the world saw the delicate relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and feared that having more nuclear states would 
be even less secure.  Due to this concern, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was 
introduced and opened for signatures in 1968.  The purpose of the NPT was to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapon technology to other nations [4].  It became necessary to 
develop safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation.   
Nuclear safeguards are ways to ensure that non nuclear weapon states are not 
using their nuclear material for weapons proliferation [5].  By increasing the likelihood of 
early detection, safeguards deter the non nuclear state from using nuclear material for 
nefarious purposes.  Current safeguard measures include a full range inspection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Nuclear facility operators are required to 
keep detailed, accurate records of the movement of nuclear materials.  Video surveillance 
and on-site inspections are also used to ensure the location of the nuclear fuel [5].  The 
IAEA has recently started a push towards Safeguard-by-Design (SBD) for new nuclear 
facilities.  The IAEA describes the SBD approach as one in which “international 
safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the 
initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning”.  The goal 




also may include designing the safeguard as part of the nuclear material itself.  In the case 
of power reactors, the safeguard could be designed as part of the fuel. 
1.1.2 Special Nuclear Materials Handling in Light Water Reactor (LWR) 
Systems.  Light water reactors (LWRs) generally use uranium as its fuel.  Before going 
through the core of a LWR, the uranium has to be enriched and fabricated into fuel.  It is 
necessary that the uranium enrichment is between 2% and 4% by weight of U235.  After 
enrichment, the uranium is fabricated into ceramic fuel pellets and placed in the fuel rods 
which are then arranged in a fuel assembly [7].  The fuel is then placed in the core and 
burned, after which the spent fuel would be taken out of the core and placed in an on-site 
water pool to cool for as long as 20 years before final disposal [7].  In the case of a nation 
seeking to pursue peaceful use of nuclear power, the enriched fuel will be provided to the 
nation by an existing nuclear state.  However, the nation would be responsible for storing 
and safeguarding the spent fuel during the cooling period.  During this nuclear fuel cycle, 
a nation intent on diverting fuel for proliferation or a would-be rogue nation has 
opportunities to steal the fuel.  Nations with such clandestine intent are not likely to 
engage in overt diversion of fuel material due to the current safeguards in place.  
However, covert diversion would be likely.  Such states would be more likely to avoid 
suspicion by stealing a few fuel rods from an assembly for diversion if they are secretly 





1.1.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Systems.  Of the 437 power reactors 
in the world, 357 of those are LWRs [7][8].  Out of the LWRs, there are 273 pressurized 
water reactors (PWRs) [8].  After World War II, research was being conducted in the use 
of nuclear technology in power production and naval propulsion.  The United States 
focused on LWR designs which led to the development of the PWR design [9].  The 
PWR is characterized by having a primary and secondary loop.  The primary loop 
contains pressurized water which goes through the core and contains some radioactivity.  
The secondary loop contains non radioactive water and steam which turns the turbines.  
Both loops meet in the steam generator where the heat from the water in the primary loop 
is transferred to the water in the secondary loop which generate steam [7].  A nation 
looking to embrace nuclear power would most likely start with a PWR system as it is the 
most established of all reactor designs.  Moreover, the abundance of this reactor type 
makes the PWR system a candidate in the development of a strategy that will enhance 
nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation.   
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH  
 The objective of this project is to explore the viability of using certain 
radionuclides for unique identification of nuclear fuels from fabrication to disposal or 
reprocessing.  This effort is focused on the implementation of an identification strategy in 
PWR fuel assemblies.  Particularly in a case where the fuels are supplied to a state that is 
apparently pursuing nuclear power for peaceful use, it is nearly impossible to accurately 
judge the intentions of such state.  However, activities indicative of adverse use of 
nuclear materials could be monitored in a timely manner.  To achieve this, it is 




approach proposed in this project is to have the fuel safeguard designed as part of the fuel 
at the time of fabrication.  This approach seeks to minimize reliance on overlaid Material 
Control & Accountancy (MC&A) strategies such as number tags, video surveillance, and 
physical inspection.  Through this strategy, a missing fuel assembly or one that has been 
tampered with would be identified within reasonable time before any diversion could 
result in special material recovery by the perpetrators.  In order to achieve the objective 
stated above, the following tasks were completed: 
1. Selection criteria for candidate radionuclides that would be effective tracers and 
signal generators for fuel tagging in this strategy 
2. Determination of the effectiveness of tagging materials particularly during reactor 
operation and post irradiation.  
3. Determination of the impact of tagging materials on current reactor operation and 
safety standards. 
The first task was accomplished by establishing selection criteria based on 
desirable properties of a candidate radionuclide and the selection was made through the 
review of nuclear data files and cross sections.  The second and third tasks were 
completed through the use of Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP).  The 
code was used to run the simulations of a PWR core with the nuclear safeguard designed 
as part of the fuel.  The reactor core was modeled based on a Westinghouse AP1000 core 
configuration, which was designed to operate at a temperature and pressure of 573K and 
155 bars, respectively.  It should be noted that unlike AP1000, the fresh fuel composition 




criticality calculations were performed using MCNP5 and core burn up calculations were 
performed with MCNPX2.7.0.  The core was run at a constant power of 1100 MW.[10]  
The uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel and the identifier were burned in the core for a total of 






2. DETERMINATION OF TAGGING RADIONUCLIDES 
The proposed strategy involved the use of radionuclides in the tagging and 
monitoring of nuclear fuel assemblies.  Through the radionuclide tags, any assembly 
would be uniquely identified and its history could be retraced.  For such a strategy to be 
successful, the nature and/or denaturing of the radionuclide must lend itself to accurate 
profiling.  The buildup or depletion of signals generated by these radionuclides must be 
traceable.  In this method, combinations of concentrations, concentration changes, 
activity ratios and other metrics could be used to establish unique tags to any fuel 
assembly being supplied to a receiving state.  In this work the modalities for profiling the 
radionuclides over time is proposed.  It should be noted that the development of such 
metrics is outside the scope of this work. 
2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA 
As part of the ultimate goal of nuclear fuel identification and monitoring, a 
preliminary investigation was performed into radionuclides that may be useful in the 
implementation of the strategy.  The approach involved selection of candidate 
radionuclides out of over 200 from the chart of nuclides [11].  The selection criteria 
include: 
• Non-actinide: Actinides exhibit complex behavior during irradiation. 
• Gamma signature: The potential unique identifier should emit a unique 
signal that can be detected.  In this case, unique is defined as the ease of 




selected radionuclides have gamma energies close to each other.  This will 
facilitate the resolution of the detected signals from the radionuclides.  
• Medium to long half-life: A radioactive sample would decay completely in 
about 10 half-lives. Hence half-life of 10 years or more is desirable. 
• Availability naturally or through synthesis:  It is imperative that the 
radionuclide can be economically produced. 
• High melting point: The physical form of the radionuclide needs to be 
preserved under reactor operating conditions. 
• Small absorption cross section: Low cross section ensures that the 
radionuclide is not compromised via transmutation in the reactor 
environment. 
2.2 SELECTED TAGGING MATERIAL 
Table 2.1 provides the list of radionuclides that could potentially be used as the 
unique identifier.  Seven radionuclides have been selected for the purpose of 
identification based on the criteria listed earlier.  Ag108m was deleted from the list of 
potential identifiers due to its cross-section information’s absence in the MCNP Data 
Libraries. 
 
2.3 LIMITATIONS OF SELECTED MATERIAL 
Some of these nuclides did not meet all the desired criteria.  Table 2.2 shows a 
check list of the criteria each radionuclide met.  Cs-137 has a very low melting point.  




Cesium Chromate (IV) which has a melting point of 982°C.  All other radionuclides with 
melting point below 900°C could also be used in forms with high melting point.  
Examples include Barium Hexaboride and Europium Boride with melting point of 




Table 2.1.List of potential radionuclides for the unique identifier 




























Nb94 2.0x104 15.8 2477
Ag108m 420 50.7* 962
Cs137 30.07 0.25 28.5
Ba133 10.53 2.8 727
Eu152 13.54 12,796 822
Eu154 8.59 1,353 822
















Table 2.2 Checklist of the radionuclides that met each criterion 
  Radionuclide 
Criteria Nb94 Ag108m Cs137 Ba133 Eu152 Eu154 Ho166m 
Non-Actinide        
Unique Gamma 
Signature   
  
   
Half Life (≥10 
years) 







    
Low Absorption 
Cross-Section   
  





All except Cs-137 and Ba-133 have significant absorption cross section at room 
temperature.  Particularly for the holmium and europium nuclides, the cross sections are 
large enough for the samples to be denatured in a reactor environment [11].  It may be 
possible to shield these nuclides from thermal neutron absorption by encasing the finally 
fabricated identifier in a neutron shield such as cadmium foil.  Cadmium-113 has a cross 
section of 20,600 barns which is 38% higher than that of Eu152, the largest cross section 
within the chosen radionuclides.  It is expected that the cadmium case would cut off the 
thermal neutrons that would otherwise contribute to the transmutation of the identifiers.   
Some radionuclides have gamma energies close to one another.  For example, Eu-
152 and Eu-154 have gamma signatures of 121.8 keV and 123.1 keV, respectively.  
Depending on detector resolution, these gammas may not be easily separated.  However, 
both nuclides have other gamma signatures that are distinct enough for facilitated proper 
and unique identification.  This is also the case for Nb-94, Ag-108m and Ho-166m with 




All selected nuclides except Eu-154 have half-lives greater than 10 years.  Eu-154 
with an 8.59 year half-life, would have measurable contribution to the identification of 
the nuclear fuel for more than 50 years [11].  Hence the half-life issue does not pose a 





3. EFFECTIVENESS METRICS OF TAGGING MATERIAL 
The two items that could compromise the effectiveness of the tagging material are 
signal interference from the spent fuel and transmutation susceptibility of the identifier. 
Each of these can compromise the integrity of the unique signal that is detected.  It is 
necessary that the identifiers do not have any negative impacts on current reactor 
operations and safety standards as well. To determine the effect, it was necessary to 
compare the keff of the core with the identifier and without it. 
3.1 SIGNAL INTERFERENCE 
The depleted fuel in the core may contain either the same radionuclides which 
will be used as the identifier or different radionuclides which may have gamma 
signatures that are close to that of the identifier.  Therefore if the signal from the spent 
fuel compromises the unique signal being emitted from the identifier, it would be difficult 
to distinguish the signals that are from the unique identifier.  Figure 3.1 demonstrates 
how the extraneous signals from the fission products may interact with the unique signal 
from the identifier.  Figure 3.1a shows how the external gamma signals from the spent 
fuel could contaminate the unique signal from the identifier and give an inaccurate 
reading in the detector.  Figure 3.1b shows how the contamination of the unique signal 
could be avoided if the external signal was adequately shielded.  This shielding could 





To determine if the unique signal is compromised by the gamma rays coming 
from the depleted fuel, it was necessary to calculate the activity of each radionuclide after 
each time step using equation 3.1 [12]: 
  	
                                                   (3.1) 
where, α0 is the initial activity of the radionuclide in Becquerel (bq), 
λ is the decay constant in sec-1and 
t is the elapsed time in sec. 
Using the F4 tally in MCNPX, the neutron flux (cm-2) is given for each expected gamma 




(a) (b)  
Figure 3.1 Spent fuel signal interfering with identifier signal. (a) Photons from the 
spent fuel compromising the unique signature of the identifier.  




3.2 SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE IDENTIFIER TO TRANSMUTATION 
Since the signal is dependent upon the natural decay of the identifiers, it is 
important that the radionuclides are not compromised by transmutation.  It is desirable 
that the decay of the radionuclides is dominated by natural decay rather than neutron 
absorption.  To determine the dominating decay mode, the ratio of the reaction rate over 
the natural decay rate was used.  Equation 3.2 gives the reaction rate and equation 3.3 
gives the natural decay. 
                                       (3.2) 
where, N is the atom density of the radionuclide in atoms/cm3, 
             σγ is the radiative capture cross section in barns (b) and 
             Φ is the neutron flux is neutrons/cm2-s. 
                                            (3.3) 
Equation 3.4 gives the ratio of the reaction rate over the decay rate. 
    	                                      (3.4) 
If the decay ratio is greater than 1, then the decay is mostly due to the reaction 
rate.  If it is equal to 1, then the decay rate and reaction are equal.  If it is less than 1, then 
the decay is mostly due to the decay rate.  It is desirable that the decay ratio is less than 
one and is mostly due to natural decay. 
The F4 tally multiplier in MCNPX was used to determine the reaction rate.  The 
atom density (N) was calculated by MCNPX from the information available in the input 
file.  The radiative capture cross section was obtained from the MCNP Data Libraries. 




output of the tally multiplier and the neutron intensity (neutrons/sec.) provides the 
reaction rate in disintegrations per seconds or Becquerel (Bq). 
The neutron intensity is needed to obtain the flux in the radionuclides that would 
be used in the calculation of the reaction rate as can be seen in equation 3.5 [12].   
                                                         3.5 
where, I is the neutron intensity in neutrons/sec and 
            is the track length flux in cm-2 from the F4 tally. 
The average neutron intensity of the core was calculated in MCNPX for each time 
step.   
3.2.1 Uncertainty Associated with Nuclear Cross Section Data.  Many nations 
use their own evaluated nuclear data libraries. For example, China, Japan, and the USA 
use the Chinese Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (CENDL), Japanese Evaluated Nuclear 
Data Library (JENDL), and Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF), respectively.  Each 
library has a unique method for evaluating neutron cross sections for radionuclides which 
leads to discrepancies.  Figure 3.2 shows the differences in radiative capture cross 
sections from multiple data libraries.  For this reason, the cross section for a radionuclide 
could be different in each library.  For instance, the method used to evaluate the total 
cross section for cesium-137 in JENDL 4.0 was to add all the partial cross sections 
together [13]. The partial cross sections, including radiative capture, were evaluated by 
use of the CCONE code, a code for nuclear data evaluation [13][14].  CASTHY, a 
neutron cross section statistical model, was use to evaluate the radiative capture cross 





Figure 3.2 Comparative cross sections of each radionuclide from the identifier from 
various nuclear data libraries from Janis-3.4. 
 
The tracking method proposed in this paper is based off of the information from 
ENDF/B VII.0 Library.  The differences in cross section data for the libraries could have 
an impact on simulations.  Simulations using different libraries may result in various 
transmutation rates for the selected tagging materials.  This is the main cause of 




with the cross section data is thus propagated to the transmutation analysis for the tagging 
radionuclides.  It should be noted that the cross-section for some radionuclides is 
sometimes adopted from other data libraries.  For this reason, some data libraries may 
have the identical cross section profiles for a radionuclide. For example, ENDF/B-VII.0 
used the cross-section evaluation from JENDL 3.3 for Niobium-94 [17]. 
3.2.2 Thermal Neutron Flux.  Using MCNP5, the flux in different parts of the 
core was obtained.  The flux is used to determine the likelihood of the tagging material 
having interactions with the thermal neutrons.  Figure 3.3 shows the flux per lethargy 
spectrum in the whole assembly, in the gas plenum, at the unshielded identifier location 
and shielded identifier location.  The thermal neutron flux in the assembly is at least two 
orders of magnitude higher than the flux in the plenum.  The flux at the unshielded 
identifier location is about two orders of magnitudes lower than the plenum flux.  This 
indicates that far less thermal neutrons are getting to the identifier location then there are 
in the entire assembly or plenum.  It is expected that there will be little interaction with 
the unshielded identifier because of the low thermal neutron flux in that location.  This 
means that the identifiers are less likely to undergo transmutation. The earlier suggestion 
of encasing the identifiers in cadmium cover (see section 2.3) was evaluated.  The 
resulting flux profile in the identifier location had the thermal neutrons completely cut-off 
as shown in Figure 3.3.  This is an indication of the effectiveness of a cadmium shield in 
the mitigation of identifier transmutation via thermal neutron capture.   
Figure 3.4 shows the cross section of each radionuclide with the flux spectrum in 
the identifier location over the neutron energy spectrum.  The thermal neutron flux peaks 




not expected for these radionuclides.  The peak corresponds to high cross sections for 




Figure 3.3 A comparison of the neutron flux in the fuel assembly, plenum, at the 





3.3 IMPACT OF TAGGING MATERIAL ON REACTOR OPERATION 
It is desirable for the tagging material to have little effect on the reactor 
operations.  To observe the effect of the tagging material on the reactor, the criticality 
was analyzed.  The effective multiplication factor was compared between the core with 
the tagging material inside and the core without it.  See Sections 4.2 to 4.4 for 





Figure 3.4 Flux spectrum at the identifier location overlaid with the ENDF/B-VII.0 










4. ASSESSMENT OF PWR WITH TAGGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES 
4.1. THE PWR MODEL 
4.1.1 PWR Core Details.  The geometry used for the fuel was cylindrical pellets 
with a diameter of 8.2 mm.  The fuel pellets were modeled as one long pellet within the 
fuel pin with a length of 366 cm rather than individual pellets with a length of 13.5 mm 
each.  The cladding material had a thickness of 0.57 mm with an outer diameter of 9.5 
mm.  Each individual fuel rod in an assembly had a rod pitch of 12.6 mm and a height of 
400 cm.  The reactor core contained 157 fuel assemblies with each assembly arranged in 
a 17 x 17 array.  Out of the 289 fuel locations, there were 264 fuel rods in each assembly.  
The core diameter was 398.8 cm [10][18][19].  Table 4.1 gives the core design 
specifications.  A top view of the model of the whole core is shown in Figure 4.1 using 
MCNPX Visual Editor Plotter Version X_24E.  Figure 4.2 is a top view of a fuel 
assembly in the core.  Figure 4.3 is the side view of the model showing the fuel pins with 
the fuel inside. 
The fuel used in the reactor was uranium dioxide (UO2) with a density of 10.41 
g/cm3 [12].  The fuel was enriched to 5%.  Water was used as the moderator in the model 
and helium was used to fill the gap between the clad and pellets, as well as the plenum 
[18].  The cladding material was made up of ZIRLO whose composition was 98% 





Table 4.1 Core design specifications 
CORE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS 
Temperature 573K   
Pressure 155 Bars   
Moderator H2O   
Coolant H2O   
Fuel 




Diameter 8.2 mm 





Clad Thickness 0.57 mm 
Diameter 9.5 mm 
Height 4 m 
Assembly 
Geometry 17 x 17 
Pitch 12.6 mm 
# of Rod 
Locations 289 
# of Fuel Rods 264 







Figure 4.1 x-y cross-sectional view of the core model in MCNPX Visual Editor 




Figure 4.2 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor 






Figure 4.3 x-y cross-sectional view of the fuel assembly in MCNPX Visual Editor 





4.1.2 Tagging Material Placement.  The identifiers (tagging radionuclides) that 
were used were arranged in a cylindrical wafer sized material with a 3 mm thickness. The 
diameter of the identifier was 8.2 mm.  The 3 mm thickness of the identifier was made up 
of 0.5 mm thick layers of each identifier material as shown in Figure 4.4.  The top of the 
identifier was located 0.5 mm from the top of the fuel pin.  To keep the identifier in place 
at the top, an extra layer of 0.57 mm thick ZIRLO material was placed 3.5 mm from the 
top of the pin directly beneath the identifier. 
4.2. REACTOR OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS - CHANGE IN keff 
To determine if the tagging material changed the criticality of the core, the core 
was ran with the tagging material inside and ran without it.  Figure 4.5 shows that there 
was little change between the profile with and without the tagging material.  Overall, the 




change in core reactivity, ∆ρ, due to the presence of the tagging material.  The maximum 
positive reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256.  
The maximum negative reactivity change on the other hand was at day 2000 with a value 
of -0.00441 ± 0.00249.  It should be noted that the reactivity effect is approximately 
consistent over the reactor operation period.  The error bars on the change in reactivity at 





Figure 4.4 x-z cross-sectional view of the identifier in a fuel pin.  







Figure 4.5 Criticality of the core with and without the tagging material over time 





4.3. TRANSMUTATION EFFECTS 
In order to assess the impact of transmutation on the selected tagging 
radionuclides, the identifiers’ concentrations were calculated at specific times over 2200 
days of simulated reactor operation.  These were compared with their concentrations in 
the case of decay-only scenario.  This was done to evaluate the additional loss of the 
radionuclides by neutron capture and how the loss – if any – may impact the reliability of 
the signals generated by the tagging radionuclides.   
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Where " is the mass of the radionuclide at any time  and  is its decay constant.  The 
solution to equation 4.1 is: 
"  "	
                                               (4.2) 
Where, m0 is the initial mass of the radionuclide. 
However, in a reactor environment the rate of change is also influenced by 
absorption reaction, the rate of change equation is: 
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Where +( is the energy dependent absorption cross section of the radionuclide and 
,)*, (, ' is the neutron flux with energy ( about location )* in the reactor at time '.  
Equation 4.3 assumed that none of the radionuclide may be transmuted to another 
amongst them.  Nevertheless, the solution to the equation depends on the knowledge of 
the flux function ,)*, (, '.  By using MCNPX for the simulation, this equation is 
solved to give " at the times steps specified. 
It is convenient to designate the radionuclide concentration for the decay only 
calculation as " and the concentration which included transmutation effects as 
"6.  It is expected that the additional loss due to transmutation would make "6 less 
than ".  Hence we may characterize the transmutation effect, 76 by the fractional 
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Ideally, it is desirable for 76 to be zero or as close to zero as possible.  This would imply 
that the transmutation effect is negligible. 
Figure 4.6 shows a transmutation effect for each radionuclide over the reactor 
operation time.  The 76 value is close to zero for all time steps.  The worst case of 
transmutation effect was on Eu152 at about 1.17%.  This indicates that the loss of mass 
was mostly due to natural decay rather than through neutron interaction.  Since the rate of 
decay for each radionuclide can be predicted, that characteristic could be used as a way to 
identify the fuel.  Through a combination of concentration ratios of the radionuclides, 
unique signals can be made. A change of concentration in even one radionuclide denotes 
a new identifier.  It should be noted that the transmutation effect was evaluated without 
cadmium shield around the identifiers.  With a cadmium shield effectively cutting off the 
thermal neutrons (see Figure 3.3), the transmutation effect should be mitigated with a 
cadmium shield. Recall that the thermal neutron absorption cross section of Cd113 is 
38% higher than that of Eu152.  Given that only 1.17% of the transformed Eu152 is via 
neutron absorption, then the loss of Cd113 via neutron absorption in the same flux 
exposure should be about 38% higher. It is expected that the cadmium should not be 










4.4 EFFECT OF FISSION PRODUCTS ON IDENTIFIER SIGNAL DETECTION 
 Figure 4.7 compares the gamma spectrum of the identifier material at the 
beginning-of-cycle (BOC) of the core, end-of-cycle (EOC) of the core, and after 30 days 
post-irradiation.  The BOC starts at day 0 when the core starts to burn the fuel, and the 
EOC is at day 2200 when the core stops burning.  Fresh UO2 was placed in the core at 
BOC. Therefore, it is not expected that any signal from the UO2 should interfere with the 
signal from the tagging material.  At the EOC, the peaks are noticeably higher compared 
to the peaks at the BOC.  This indicates that the signal from the tagging material will be 
compromised by the signal from the spent fuel.  From Figure 4.7, the external signals 




products with the same atomic mass as the selected radionuclides but with lower proton 
number.  For these fission products to improve their proton-to-neutron number ratio, they 
decay towards higher proton numbers, thereby resulting in the increase in abundance of 
the selected radionuclides in the fission product inventory in the spent fuel.  Nb94 signal 
intensity increased by 175% at EOC and 478% 30 days post-irradiation.  Cs137 saw an 
increase of 12% and 89% at EOC and 30 days post-irradiation, respectively.  Ba133 
signal intensity increased by 25% at EOC and 111% post-irradiation.  Eu152 saw an 
increase of 46% at EOC and 209% post-irradiation.  Eu154 signal intensity increased by 
1260% at EOC and 4545% post-irradiation.  Ho166m saw an increase 200% at EOC and 
379% post-irradiation.  The changes in signal intensities are summarized in Table 4.2. 
The contribution of the external signals could be mitigated by shielding the tagging 
material from the spent fuel signal with a material such as lead.  Another approach to 
mitigate this issue is signal refinement through the use of fission product yield curve to 
isolate signal contribution from the fission products.  A combination of the two 








Figure 4.7 Gamma spectrum of the tagging material at the beginning of cycle, the 
end of cycle, and 30 days post-irradiation. 
 
 




E (keV) Nuclide Signature Change in signal intensity (%) 
      EOC 30d Post-Irr. 
81 Ba133 Secondary 242.96 397.86 
122 Eu152 Primary 45.59 209.10 
123 Eu154 Primary 1259.61 4544.81 
184 Ho166m Primary 199.97 378.54 
283 Cs137 Secondary 27.52 117.84 
303 Ba133 Tertiary 104.06 333.92 
344 Eu152 Tertiary 104.47 199.98 
365 Ba133 Primary 25.01 111.11 
662 Cs137 Primary 11.75 89.27 
703 Nb94 Secondary 8.38 78.17 
712 Ho166m Tertiary 4.66 557.56 
810 Ho166m Secondary 58.43 34.36 
871 Nb94 Primary 175.33 478.44 
1275 Eu154 Secondary -47.10 94.44 





After reviewing over 200 radionuclides, six have been selected for the purpose of 
identifying fuel assemblies: 
• Nb94: Metallic element, Melting Point=2477°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 15.8 
barns, T1/2=2.0x104 years. 
• Cs137: Metallic element, Melting Point=28.5°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 0.25 
barns, T1/2=30.7 years. 
• Ba133: Metallic element, Melting Point=727°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 2.8 
barns, T1/2=10.53 years. 
• Eu152: Metallic element, Melting Point=822°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 12,796 
barns, T1/2=13.54 years. 
• Eu154: Metallic element, Melting Point=822°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 1,353 
barns, T1/2=8.59 years. 
• Ho166m: Metallic element, Melting Point=1472°C, σγ @ 0.0253 eV= 
3,609 barns, T1/2=1.2x103 years. 
They were chosen based on the following criteria: 
1. non-actinide  
2. detectable gamma signature  




4. natural existence or ease of synthesis  
5. high melting point  
6. small absorption cross section.  
Some of the selected radionuclides did not satisfy all criteria, but are deemed to 
have possible remedy to the short-comings. For example, 137Cs has a very low melting 
point, which may be remedied by making the tagging material a Cesium compound such 
as Cesium Chromate (IV) with a melting point of 982°C. Another example is the case of 
Europium and Holmium radionuclides with cross sections up to 13,000 barns at 
0.0253eV.  The effects of the huge thermal cross sections may be mitigated by encasing 
the tagging materials in other materials with high thermal neutron absorption.   
A whole core model of a typical PWR was developed in MCNP.  This model was 
used as the basis for the evaluation of the performance of the tagging materials in the core 
as well as their impact on reactor operation.  The results indicated that there is negligible 
impact of the tagging materials on the reactor operation.  The maximum positive 
reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 ± 0.00256.  The 
maximum negative reactivity change on the other hand was at day 2000 with a value of -
0.00441 ± 0.00249.  In addition the effect of transmutation on the depletion of the tagging 
material is negligible.  The maximum transmutation effect noted is 1.17% in Eu152.  
Hence it was concluded that the decay profile of the radionuclides is sufficient to 
reconstruct the initial concentrations of the radionuclides, thus characterizing the fuel 
being monitored.  A cadmium shield could also be used to mitigate some of that 




signal from the tagging material will be compromised at the core EOC and beyond, due 
to extraneous signals from the spent fuel.  This could be mitigated via shielding and 
signal refinement.  It was noted that at EOC, the maximum change in intensity was 
1260% which occurred in Eu154.  Cs137 saw the minimum change of 12%.  At 30 days 
post-irradiation, Eu154 saw the maximum change in signal intensity of 4545%.  Cs137 
saw the minimum change of 89%. 
Future effort on this project may include development of tagging schemes for 
unique identification, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for the reconstruction of the 
initial radionuclide concentration.  In addition further work could be done to optimization 
of extraneous signal shielding, and develop schemes for signal refinement since the 
success of the proposed strategy depends on the ability to profile the radionuclides used 
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